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RESPONSE OF B. LLOYD POELMAN

B. Lloyd Poelman,

I

JD

share Judge Matheson's pleasure and consternation in appearing before
you today. When I stand before a group of therapists, I always have
the feeling I am being psychoanalyzed. I just want you to know that
it's a two-way street because, as a lawyer, I have been looking you over
and evaluating you as potential expert witnesses.
I don't come to you as an expert on child abuse. My closest current involvement is the perception of our nine children that they are
abused when I ask one of them to do the dishes on a Friday night.
I think the only instance from my own youth that I can vividly recall
was once as a pre-teenager when I brought my school lunch box home
and left a little garter snake in it. As I laid the lunchbox on the kitchen
table, my mother opened it. I later regretted that she bruised her arm
in the course of administering the well-deserved punishment to my
backside. I have long since forgiven her of that (I think before she
ever forgave me), and I don't think the episode has adversely affected
me-or at least I can't blame any of my present psychological condition
on that event.
We are here to talk about a very serious concern. I would like to
let you know the evolurion of my recent thinking because I believe
it has important bearing on what I would like you to see through my
eyes today. Two years ago I would not have given serious consideration to child abuse matters. This issue wasn't part of my upbringing.
As I read statistics abour the prevalency of child abuse, I had trouble
believing them. They didn't seem congruent with the milieu in which
I was living. Bur as I started learning more of this issue, mostly through
being a legal advisor for LDS Social Services and with the help of many
organizations that are represented here today, my eyes were opened.
I have evolved from a position of caurious suspicion to conviction in
several areas.
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First, I now realize the problem is much more prevalent than I had
ever suspected, not just because reporting has increased, but because
I believe the incidences of child abuse have significantly increased in
recent years.
Second, the devastating impact on the victims of child abuse is
far worse than I had suspected, sometimes even from what some may
deem to be very minor or casual encounters.
Third, children usually are to be believed in these instances.
And fourth, it rarely, if ever, occurs (and I tend to suspect the "if
ever") that one who is guilty of such abuse, especially in the sexual
area, can ever truly reform without public disclosure and without
professional assistance.
Having come to those conclusions myself, I found that I was constantly being asked, "Why doesn't the LDS church react differently
than seems to be its posture?" I have participated in very close
interactiop with the leadership of the LDS church concerning the child
abuse issue, and I believe the evolution of thought I just described
for myself has, in fact, recently occurred rather uniformly among the
General Authorities of the Church. One of the results has been development of a child abuse pamphlet entitled Chzld Abuse Helps for
Ecclesiastical Leaders, which was distributed recently. Telling you that
the final product is Draft Number 57 may help you understand that
it was a very carefully considered document. The challenge we still face
is bringing that information and that conversion of thought down to
the level of local leaders, where it has the most important meaning
and application.
The pamphlet is only a first step. A training procedure is also in
process of development. Much more undoubtedly will be necessary,
bur I am convinced the LDS church is in the process of making an
educational change that cannot happen with the snap of a finger. It
takes some reasonable time, and I hope you will perceive yourselves
as instruments of that change as well.
Now, let's move directly to the announced issue. I have great respect
for Judge Matheson who, at the time the attorney general's opinion
he referred to was issued, was employed by the Office of the Attorney
General. One of the great challenges for lawyers is being able to disagree
without being disagreeable. That is especially true with respect to a
judge before whom one might still want to practice. I would like to
point out the areas in which we concur and those in which we disagree,
together with the reasons, from my perspective, for that disagreement.
If there is any conflict of purpose between child abuse reporting
requirements and priest-penitent provisions of the law (and I am not
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saying there is), it's not just an ecclesiastical difference; it is a social
difference as well.
The purpose clause of the Reporting Child Abuse or Neglect Act
says, "It is the purpose of this act to protect the best interests of children,
offer protective services to prevent harm to the children, stabilize the
home environment, preserve family life whenever possible, and encourage
cooperation among the states in dealing with the problem of child
abuse." 1 believe the posture 1 am going to describe for you is
completely consistent with that.
Judge Matheson has pointed out to you the purpose clause relating
to Utah's priest-penitent provision. It states, "There are particular relations in which it is the policy of the law to encourage confidence and
to preserve inviolate; therefore, a person cannot be examined as a witness
in the following cases ... " and then it lists the traditional husbandand-wife exception; an attorney / client exception; a public officer, on
account of his public duty; and physicians or surgeons with respect
to patient care. But squeezed in as number three among those is a
provision stating, "A clergyman or priest cannot, without the consent of the person making the confession, be examined as to any confession made to him in his professional character in the course of discipline
enjoined by the church to which he belongs."
1 don't appear before you today as an official spokesman for the
LDS church or for LDS Social Services. But 1 can at least accurately
reflect the kind of advice 1 give them when these matters come to me
for opinion.
First, with respect to LDS Social Services personnel, there is absolutely no privilege exempting them from reporting child abuse. As
1 have said to some of you in this group in another setting, you may
get a phone call from a bishop who says, "1 have just had a conversation with so and so" (and he specifically identifies that person). Then
he adds, "Nearly two years ago he had a problem with fondling a child;
he feels bad about it and has voluntarily confessed it to me. 1 want
him to get some counseling to help clear it up, but 1 would rather
that you not report this." You have to say, ''I'm sorry, Bishop, that
is reportable. 1 already have enough information; 1 must report it."
The bishop replies, "Oh, but you don't understand. This man
is a pillar of the community, as you know."
"Yes, 1 know that," you answer. "1 have to report it."
"But you know that his wife is not a member of the Church."
"1 know that, but we have to report it."
"Do you know that she is suicidal and this will probably have
disastrous results and consequences?"
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I must say, as legal advisor, there is no exemption from reporting
that. The reporting requirement is unqualified.
In another instance someone may come to a Mormon bishop and
say, "Bishop, I have reason to believe there is something wrong going
on in that home," and then maybe he or she discloses some facts.
Those facts are not privileged. That is not a confession.
A close case arises if a wife comes in and says, "Bishop, I want
to tell you something in confidence. I believe there may be something
inappropriate going on between my husband and his stepdaughter (my
daughter)." The question is raised, "Is that a confession?" Strictly
speaking, no. That communication would probably require the bishop
to report the matter. The only instance where it is clear that no reporting is required by a bishop or similar ecclesiastical officer is when the
bishop learns of child abuse in a confessional setting from an offender
who is a member of that bishop's congregation.
What is the bishop instructed to do in that limited situation? The
Chtfd Abuse Pamphlet says, "Before true repentance can occur, any
serious transgression must be confessed to the bishop or other appropriate
church officer." Then after citing various scriptural examples, it states,
"Church officers have a duty to keep any information received from
a member's confession strictly confidential. However, if the mem ber
indicates he has violated a civil or criminal law, try to persuade him
to clear the matter with civil authorities as a condition of repentance
and forgiveness" (p. 5). So, even when disclosure of child abuse
occurs in that ((ilnfessional setting to a bishop, ecclesiastical officers
are instructed to encourage the offender to make that disclosure voluntarily
or to authorize the bishop to do so. In most instances I believe the
bishop would urge the repentant member to receive some professional
assistance, perhaps through LOS Social Services or a similar organization' which would then assist the offender in making the required report.
In every instance of this type that I am aware of, the bishop has
been successful in persuading the person to permit that reporting to
be done. The consequence is that the offender then presents himself
before the law in a more favorable light. He has made a confession;
he has consented to get professional help; he is receiving religious support
from the Church and professional help from Social Services or some
other organization; and he is in a posture where he can be aided.
The only circumstance in which I believe the bishop would not
be permitted to make a disclosure would be when, after all of this
has been explained and attempted, the confessor says, "Bishop, I
appreciate what you are saying and I came here hoping to relieve myself
of guilt. But I can't report the matter at this stage, and I can't give
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you permission to report it." In that instance, it is my opinion that
both under present law and under the United States Constitution it
would be improper for the bishop to make a report of that incident.
That doesn't mean the bishop, with that knowledge, would be excused
from taking action to protect a child that may be in danger. But he
cannot be compelled to report or to testify.
Judge Matheson makes an important point that our priest- penitent
privilege is an evidentiary privilege and is not su bstantive legislation.
I really hesitate resorting to a discussion of legal history, but let me
briefly explain how the law evolved to its present state.
We are talking today only about Utah law. Most other states in
the union have passed similar legislation, though almost none of them
are of identical wording or scope. The Utah Division of Family Services
first proposed legislation requiring that child abuse be reported. The
proposed law went through several revised drafts. Draft Number 6,
dated November 23, 1977, contained as Section 10 a provision which
was later deleted. This provision, under the heading" Abrogation of
Privilege Communications," stated, "Any privilege between husband
and wife, or between any professional person, except a lawyer and client,
including but not limited to physicians, ministers, social workers,
counselors, hospitals, clinics, day care centers, and schools, and their
clients, shall not constitute grounds for excluding evidence at any proceeding regarding child abuse or neglect of the child or the cause thereof. ' ,
Now, that provision was originally part of the proposed law, but
it was deleted before the bill was passed. The only remnant left in
the law as enacted is the present provision that the physician / patient
relationship is not grounds for failure to report. Traditional rules for
interpreting legislative history compel the conclusion that by eliminating
this proposed exclusion the legislature reaffirmed the existing priestpenitent privilege. The opinion of our office that a priest-penitent
privilege exists with respect to child abuse reporting was based on this
legislative history.
There is also a question of the constitutionality of requiring a bishop,
under the limited circumstances I defined for you, to make that disclosure.
That has an interesting history as well. You are aware that one of the
sources of our law is what we call the common law. It is the judgemade law that we inherited mostly from England and western Europe.
The Catholic church's position on confession is exceptionally strong.
As you know, if a Catholic priest discloses anything he hears in the
confessional, he is automatically excommunicated unless excused by
the Pope himself. That's how strongly the Catholics feel about confidentiality of confessions. Until the Reformation, while the Catholic
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church was dominant in England, this priest-penitent privilege was
part of the common law. After the Reformation, although it was not
strictly a part of the common law, the priest-penitent privilege tended
to be observed in tradition and administration of the law.
When the United States Constitution was adopted, including the
Bill of Rights, the First Amendment declared that Congress shall make
no law respecting the establishment of religion or abridging the free
exercise thereof. The question then became, "Does this priest-penitent
privilege have constitutional basis?" The first test of that question in
the courts occurred in a New York case in the early 1800s when a Catholic
priest refused to disclose information he had received in a confessional
setting. The court held that his refusal was a free exercise of religion
under the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution and he should
not be compelled to testify. Four years later another New York court,
considering similar refusal by a Protestant minister, reached an
opposite conclusion and the minister was cited for contempt of court.
Before the sentence could be implemented, the New York legislature
met and adopted the first priest-penitent privilege statute in the United
States. Thereafter, each of the other 49 states adopted similar legislation
in one form or another.
As a result, the question of whether the priest-penitent privilege
is a constitutional right has never reached the United States Supreme
Court. There are cases where that court and lower courts have spoken
favorably concerning the existence of that as a consitutionally protected
privilege, but that issue itself has never been directly presented. However,
in recent years as child abuse reporting statutes have been enacted by
the various states, there has been a tendency to carve out of the priestpenitent privilege an exclusion for child abuse reporting, thereby raising
the constitutional issue.
Last year in Florida there arose a case which I thought was going
to be determinative and result in a U.S. Supreme Court pronouncement. In the case of Mellish v. State ofFlorida, a Nazarene minister
in a child abuse case was called as a witness and claimed the privilege
because the accused asserted it. Incidentally, this privilege does not
belong to the priest; it belongs to the penitent. The priest cannot waive
it unless the penitent does. The penitent did not waive the privilege
in the Mellish case, and the court held the minister in contempt for
failure to disclose what had been said in a confessional setting. The
contempt situation was appealed in the state court system. The Archdiocese of the Catholic church filed a "Friend of the Court" brief in
that matter raising exactly the constitutional issues I have described.
But in January 1985 the Florida legislature amended the state's child
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abuse reponing act and made a specific statutory exception for confessions
to clergymen.
That explains why we believe that, in the limited circumstances
I have defined, the Utah statute must be read as including a priestpenitent exception to child abuse reporting.
Let me conclude with a final comment on why I believe these two
legislative policies are not as sharply in conflict as they may first
appear. I believe that if a bishop were required to disclose a confidential confession, the result would be a substahtial erosion of the doctrine and practice of confession in the Church. There is no question
but that the requirement of confession as a condition of forgiveness
is scriptural and fundamental. LOS doctrine clearly defines confession
of serious transgression as the necessary route to laying claim upon the
atonement of the Savior.
If the practice of confessional confidentiality is to be changed, then
with 150 years of history of bishops giving assurance that anything said
in that confessional setting is strictly confidential, the bishop, I believe,
would come under duty to give a forewarning: "If you are going to
confess something related to child abuse, you should know that anything
you tell me I must immediately report to the nearest police officer so
that you can be charged and prosecuted."
I believe such a step would undermine the whole practice of confession, not only in the area of child abuse but in many other areas.
There would not only be a chilling effect, but a freezing effect. If that
were to occur, I believe we would deny our ecclesiastical leaders many
opportunities they now have to provide assistance. By allowing this
reporting exception, the door is opened for bishops to counsel with
offenders, to help them seek necessary aid in reforming their lives,
and most importantly, to become aware of children who need protection
and help.
Such is my personal conviction. I respect the fact that others may
see it differently. I believe that constitutionally, legislatively, and also
on social policy grounds, the priest-penitent exception to child abuse
reporting should be maintained and preserved.
Nothing deserves our greater concern than the abuse of children.
The Savior reserved his harshest judgment and condemnation for
those who would inflict that evil. In preserving the priest-penitent
privilege in its constitutional setting, the desire is not to limit any
assistance to children but is in full harmony with the declared
purposes of the reporting statute, which purposes include stabilizing
the home environment and preserving family life whenever possible.
This can best be done by maintaining inviolate the confidentiality of
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all confessions, thereby permitting compliance with a fundamental
doctrine of salvation.

B. Lloyd Poelman is the senior attorney in the law firm of Kirton,
McConkie, Bushnell and is legal advisor to IDS Social Services.

